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Power to the People: The Supreme 
Court’s Confirmation of State Power in 
the Wake of Faithless Electors 
GABRIELLE ENGEL* 
One of the most cherished American liberties is the right 
to vote. Yet, the Constitution does little to protect the integ-
rity of individual voters. Instead, the Founding Fathers cre-
ated an Electoral College to represent states’ will. Over 
time, states enacted laws requiring that electoral votes be 
cast to reflect the state popular vote. In 2016, several elec-
tors voted for candidates who did not win their state’s pop-
ular vote, grounding their actions in a believed constitu-
tional right to vote freely and unencumbered by state out-
comes. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Chiafalo 
v. Washington, holding that states may bind electoral votes. 
This Note finds that the Court’s decision properly reflects 
the Framer’s intentions and necessarily avoids political 
chaos while emphasizing a need for either state or congres-
sional action to reform the Electoral College. 
  
 
 * J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Miami School of Law; B.S. 2018, Uni-
versity of Florida. I dedicate this Note to my Grandfather, Lester Engel, who grad-
uated from the University of Miami School of Law in 1959. I am grateful for the 
unwavering encouragement, support, and patience of my family and friends. The 
publication of this Note would not be possible without their love. Thank you to 
Professor Stephen J. Schnably for his guidance and as well as the University of 
Miami Law Review for selecting this Note for publication and scrupulously edit-
ing it with me.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The “‘fundamental principle of our representative democracy,’ 
embodied in the Constitution, [is] that ‘the people should choose 
whom they please to govern them.’”1 
 
 1 Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 946 (10th Cir. 2019), rev’d per 
curiam, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 
U.S. 779, 848, 879 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
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The right to vote has long been relished as one of the most sacred 
elements of a democracy.2 Millions have fought for the right to be 
heard by their government, for the right to vote: Black Americans, 
women, and still today, convicted felons.3 However, once you pull 
back the veil, voting is a much more complicated process than it 
appears on its face.4 America is a democratic republic rather than a 
direct democracy.5 Therefore, Americans vote for electors, not pres-
idential candidates.6 Until recently, there was not a large problem 
with this system.7 After all, most states enacted laws requiring elec-
tors to vote for the winners of the state’s popular vote, thereby rep-
resenting the will of the people.8 But what happens when an elector 
violates state law and exercises independent discretion in casting 
their electoral vote in the national election? It is a question that has 
 
 2 See Democracy (Ancient Greece), NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.na-
tionalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/democracy-ancient-greece/ (last visited Jan. 
24, 2021) (discussing evolution of democracy). 
 3 See Amy Goodmen & Denis Moynihan, Opinion, Democracy Now | The 
Struggle to Vote, from the Suffragettes to Today, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL (Jan. 4, 
2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.santacruzsentinel.com/2020/01/04/democracy-
now-the-struggle-to-vote-from-the-suffragettes-to-today/ (comparing American 
women’s suffrage movement to today’s convicted felon movement for right to 
vote); see also Shadman Zaman, Violence and Exclusion: Felon Disenfranchise-
ment as a Badge of Slavery, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, 256 (2015) (ar-
guing that loss of right to vote is akin to a “badge of slavery”). 
 4 See generally Colum Lynch, Why is it so Hard to Vote in America?, 
FORGIENPOLICY.COM (Nov. 5, 2018, 1:35 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/
2018/11/05/why-is-it-so-hard-to-vote-in-america/ (covering voter suppression 
and difficulties of American election process). 
 5 Eugene Volokh, Opinion, Is the United States of America a Republic or a 
Democracy?, WASH. POST (May 13, 2015, 2:43 PM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/13/is-the-united-states-of-
america-a-republic-or-a-democracy/. 
 6 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see Chiafalo v. Wash-
ington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2319 (2020). 
 7 See Faithless Electors, FAIR VOTE [hereinafter Faithless Electors], 
https://www.fairvote.org/faithless_electors (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (document-
ing history of faithless electors). 
 8 See Electoral College: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ARCHIVES 
[hereinafter Electoral College FAQ], https://www.archives.gov/electoral-col-
lege/faq (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (discussing “winner-takes-all” system em-
ployed by forty-eight states and District of Columbia). 
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been toyed with by courts in one way or another since the 1900s.9 A 
larger than usual number of so-called “faithless electors”10 in the 
2016 presidential election, however, opened the door for Supreme 
Court review.11 In a nearly unanimous opinion that preserves mod-
ern national election practices, the Court confirmed states have the 
power to ensure electoral votes reflect the state popular vote.12 
I.  ROADMAP 
This Note will compare the constitutional analyses of the United 
States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit in the landmark faithless electors case Baca v. Colo-
rado Department of State.13 The Tenth Circuit’s opinion appeared 
to threaten modern presidential election practices.14 Some view the 
 
 9 See, e.g., Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 227–30 (1952) (discussing historical 
difficulties of Electoral College’s purpose). 
 10 Faithless electors are electors who vote for a different presidential or vice-
presidential candidate than the one for whom they pledged to vote. Faithless Elec-
tors, supra note 7. For more information on the Electoral College, see Electoral 
College Fast Facts, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
[hereinafter Electoral College Fast Facts], https://history.house.gov/Institu-
tion/Electoral-College/Electoral-College/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
 11 See infra Part III.E (discussing faithless electors in 2016); Chiafalo, 140 S. 
Ct. at 2320. 
 12 Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2316, 2320. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of 
the Court, to which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, 
Sotomayor, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Id. at 2317. Justice Thomas con-
curred in the judgment, to which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Part II. Id. 
 13 Id.; Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 956 (10th Cir. 2019), rev’d 
per curiam, 140 S. Ct. 918 (2020) (“The judgment of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is reversed for the reasons stated in [Chiafalo, 140 
S. Ct. 2316].”). 
 14 The Tenth Circuit struck down a Colorado statute similarly employed by 
almost every other state. See Electoral College FAQ, supra note 8 (discussing 
widely used “winner-takes-all” system employed by forty-eight states and the 
District of Columbia); see also Alexander Gouzoules, The “Faithless Elector” 
and 2016: Constitutional Uncertainty After the Election of Donald Trump, 28 U. 
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 215, 224–27 (2017) (outlining various deterrence-based 
statutory schemes states have enacted to prevent faithless electors). Without such 
statutes, many worried about the integrity of American votes. See Brief of Amicus 
Curiae National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Support-
ing Petitioner at 5, Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (No. 19-
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opinion as too rigid a reading of the Constitution.15 After all, if states 
do not have the inherent power to bind electors to vote in accordance 
with the state’s general election popular vote, what value does the 
popular vote have?16 Thus, the Supreme Court rightfully stepped in 
to quash fears that votes would become meaningless prior to the 
2020 election. 
This Note will argue that the Supreme Court’s reasoning was a 
necessary and sound upholding of federalist principles. Part II will 
address the facts and issues surrounding Baca. Part III will discuss 
the history of the Electoral College and the evolution of modern vot-
ing practices in America. Part IV will compare how the Tenth Cir-
cuit and Supreme Court addressed the constitutional issue presented. 
Finally, Part V will illustrate how the Court’s reasoning should be 
interpreted moving forward. 
II. BACA V. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF STATE: BACKGROUND 
A. Facts 
In April 2016, the Colorado Democratic Party nominated Mi-
chael Baca, Polly Baca, and Robert Nemanich (as a group, “the 
Electors”) to serve as presidential electors.17 After Secretary Hillary 
Clinton and Senator Tim Kaine won the popular vote in November 
2016, the group was appointed to serve as three of Colorado’s nine 
presidential electors.18 
Colorado state law requires presidential electors to cast their bal-
lots for president and vice president in favor of the candidates who 
received the highest number of votes in the Colorado general elec-
tion.19 Weary of the state’s winners, Mr. Baca asked the Colorado 
Secretary of State, Wayne Williams, what the consequences would 
be if he cast his ballot for different candidates.20 The response was 
simple: Colorado would remove any electors who did not cast their 
 
518) (“The public outrage that would arise if a faithless elector could determine 
the outcome of a presidential election would cause a Constitutional crisis . . . .”). 
 15 See infra Part IV (discussing Tenth Circuit’s originalist approach). 
 16 See infra Part V.A.1 (discussing need for broad state power over electors). 
 17 Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 902. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-304(5) (2020). 
 20 Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 902–03. 
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vote in accordance with state law and appoint new electors until all 
nine votes were cast for Secretary Clinton and Senator Kaine.21 Mr. 
Williams later received guidance from a Colorado court to remove 
noncompliant electors and appoint new electors who would vote in 
accordance with Colorado law.22 
On December 19, 2016, the nine Colorado presidential electors 
met to mark their ballots.23 Despite taking an oath to vote for the 
winners of the Colorado election, Mr. Baca cast his vote for presi-
dent for John Kasich.24 Mr. Williams subsequently removed Mr. 
Baca and replaced him with an elector who cast her ballot for Sec-
retary Clinton.25 In fear of removal, Ms. Baca and Mr. Nemanich 
then cast their votes for Secretary Clinton as well.26 After voting on 
the presidential candidates completed, Mr. Baca attempted to vote 
for Senator Kaine for vice president.27 Mr. Williams did not count 
his vote and referred Mr. Baca to the Colorado Attorney General for 
criminal investigation.28 
B.  Procedural History 
Ms. Baca and Mr. Nemanich filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the District of Colorado, to which Mr. Baca 
joined.29 The Electors sought to hold Colorado responsible for its 
deprivation of their supposed constitutional rights under Article II 
and the Twelfth Amendment.30 The Electors grounded this claim 
under Title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code.31 This sec-
tion provides that: 
 
 21 Id. at 903. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 904. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id; see Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, No. 17-cv-01937-WYD-NYW, 2018 
WL 10322062 (D. Colo. Apr. 10, 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 935 F.3d 887 
(10th Cir. 2019), rev’d per curiam, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020). 
 30 Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 904. 
 31 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any cit-
izen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress . . . .32 
The relief sought was threefold. The Electors requested that the 
court (1) find the Colorado Department of State (“Colorado”) vio-
lated the Electors’ constitutional rights, (2) declare the Colorado law 
requiring presidential electors to vote in compliance with the state 
majority winner unconstitutional, and (3) award nominal damages.33 
In response, Colorado filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the 
Electors lacked standing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) and, alternatively, failed to state a claim under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).34 The District Court dismissed the  
complaint.35 The Electors appealed to the Tenth Circuit,36 which 
 
 32 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). 
 33  Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-304 (2020); Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 
F.3d at 904. 
 34 Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 904; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12. 
 35 Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 904. 
 36 Id. at 887. Several questions of justiciability surfaced at the Tenth Circuit; 
most notably, arguments surrounding the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 
Colorado’s waiver that it is not a “person.” Id. at 905. The Tenth Circuit noted 
that “it is a well-established principle . . . that normally the [c]ourt will not decide 
a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose the 
case[,]” and therefore assessed whether the complaint itself failed because Colo-
rado is not a person under § 1983. Id. at 928–29 (quoting Bond v. United States, 
572 U.S. 844, 855 (2014)); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit 
found the requirements of § 1983 were not jurisdictional requirements. Baca v. 
Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 929. Instead, the statute’s requirements are ele-
ments of the claim, making Colorado’s waiver of the “person” element viable. Id. 
Thus, even though courts should raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte, no juris-
diction issues were present, and the court proceeded to adjudicate the constitu-
tional issue. Id. At the Supreme Court, the Justices entertained questions of justi-
ciability at oral argument but did not address such issues in the decision. Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 13, 42–43, Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca 140 S. Ct. 2316 
(2020) (No. 19-518). The Justices voiced concerns regarding Colorado’s waiver 
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published a holding that unsettled widely accepted voter expecta-
tions.37 
The Tenth Circuit found that the Tenth Amendment does not re-
serve to the states the right to bind electoral votes;38 therefore, any 
power to do so would have to be granted under Article II, which 
contains no such express delegation.39 Effectively, the court deter-
mined that presidential electors may exercise independent discretion 
when voting, unencumbered by state interference.40 
Colorado filed a petition for writ of certiorari,41 to which Mr. 
Baca responded with a petition in support;42 additionally, numerous 
states, scholars, and organizations filed amicus briefs urging the 
 
of § 1983’s “person” requirement: Justice Breyer stated, “[t]he problem that I 
view is that then any two people, a plaintiff and defendant, who would like an 
issue decided by us, simply have to waive enough matters so that it has to come 
before us because it’s not jurisdictional.” Id. at 13. However, ultimately, it appears 
the Court liberally applied the semantics of § 1983 and conceded to the waiver 
because it believed that adjudicating the issue was necessary to avoid political 
chaos. See id. at 46 (Justice Alito discussing potential political chaos if electors 
are granted a constitutional right to unencumbered voting). 
 37 See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 887; Noah Feldman, Opinion, 
Appeals Court Opens the Door to Electoral College Chaos, BLOOMBERG OP. 
(Aug. 25, 2019, 9:21 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-
08-25/electoral-college-chaos-is-possible-over-faithless-elector-ruling. 
 38 Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 946. 
 39 Id. In a 3-1 opinion, the court reversed the dismissal of Mr. Baca’s claim 
and remanded the case to the district court, holding that Mr. Baca stated a viable 
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 956. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit found 
that out of the three Electors, only Mr. Baca had standing to pursue a claim be-
cause he suffered an actual injury. Id. at 922. Mr. Baca was removed, and his votes 
were nullified, while Ms. Baca and Mr. Nemanich only suffered a fear of removal 
which caused them to vote in accordance with Colorado state law. See id at 921. 
Accordingly, the court affirmed the District Court’s ruling in part and Ms. Baca’s 
and Mr. Nemanich’s claims were dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1). Id. at 956. 
 40 See id. 
 41 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316 
(2020) (No. 19-518) [hereinafter Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari]. 
 42 Respondents’ Brief in Support of Certiorari, Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, 
140 S. Ct. 2316 (No. 19-518) [hereinafter Baca Brief in Support of Certiorari] 
(urging for Supreme Court review due to inconsistent federal guidance). 
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Supreme Court to hear the issue.43 Given the immediacy of the 2020 
presidential election, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on Janu-
ary 17, 2020.44 
The Supreme Court consolidated the case with Chiafalo v. 
Washington, a similar litigation arising from the actions of faithless 
electors in Washington during the 2016 presidential election.45 Both 
cases addressed state laws restricting electoral independence;46 
therefore, one opinion delivered by Justice Kagan applied to both 
cases.47 
C.  Holding 
The Supreme Court applied Article II liberally, finding that 
states possess “‘the broadest power of determination’ over who be-
comes an elector.”48 After considering long-established state prac-
tices of requiring electors to reflect the popular vote when casting 
ballots, the Court found that state power to appoint electors under 
Article II necessarily encompasses the ability to impose restrictions 
on voting.49 Concurring in the opinion, Justice Thomas found that 
 
 43 See Brief for South Dakota et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (No. 19-518); Brief of Professor 
Michael T. Morley as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Colo. Dep’t of 
State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (No. 19-518) (also filed in Chiafalo v. Washington, 
140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (No. 19-465)); Brief of Amicus Curiae National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Supporting Petitioner, supra note 
14; Brief of the Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Washington & Colorado, Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (No. 19-
518) (also filed in Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (No. 19-465)); Brief of Amicus Cu-
riae of the Colorado Democratic Party in Support of Petitioner, Colo. Dep’t of 
State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (No. 19-518). 
 44 Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 918 (2020) (mem.) (granting peti-
tion for writ of certiorari). 
 45 See id.; Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2322. 
 46 Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 903–04; In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 
807, 807–08 (Wash. 2019), aff’d sub nom, Chiafalo v. Washington 140 S. Ct. 
2316 (2020). 
 47 Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. at 2316; Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 
2323. 
 48 Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2324 (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 
27 (1982)). 
 49 Id. at 2327–28 (“State election laws evolved to reinforce that development, 
ensuring that a State’s electors would vote the same way as its citizens.”). 
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state power to enact such laws does not stem from Article II;50 ra-
ther, Justice Thomas reasoned that the Tenth Amendment allows 
states to exercise this power because the Constitution is otherwise 
silent on the issue.51 
III.  THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: THEN & NOW 
Before assessing the courts’ constitutional interpretations, it is 
important to understand the history behind the creation of the Elec-
toral College and its function in present day elections. 
A.  Creation of the Electoral College 
The Electoral College was created to ensure that a president 
“with ‘talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity’ could 
not achieve office without the necessary qualifications or the appro-
priate temperament.”52 Indeed, today it is easy to envision the type 
of presidential behavior about which the Framers were worried. 
The creation of the Electoral College reflects qualms the Fram-
ers had with the creation of a presidential power and issues with 
early state constitutions.53 Originally, state governors had smaller 
powers than today and were chosen by the state legislatures.54 Ac-
cordingly, the Virginia Plan proposed that, likewise, the “national 
Executive . . . be chosen by the National Legislature.”55 By contrast, 
the competing New Jersey Plan recommended that Congress consist 
of equal state representatives instead of proportionally allocated 
 
 50 Id. at 2329 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 51 Id. (“I would resolve this case by simply recognizing that ‘[a]ll powers that 
the Constitution neither delegates to the Federal Government nor prohibits to the 
States are controlled by the people of each State.’” (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. 
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 848 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting))). 
 52 Gouzoules, supra note 14, at 218 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 354 
(Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., Gideon ed. 
2001)). 
 53 See Gouzoules, supra note 14, at 218–19. 
 54 Keith E. Whittington, Originalism, Constitutional Construction, and the 
Problem of Faithless Electors, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 903, 921 (2017). Only three 
states, New York, Vermont, and Massachusetts, used an alternative method for 
choosing an executive state power. Id. at 921–22. 
 55 Id. at 922 (quoting 3 JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 57 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1902)). 
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state representatives.56 However, state familiarity with governors 
appointed by the legislature highlighted the need for the national ex-
ecutive power to be independent.57 
The Framers discussed various options for ensuring independent 
appointment; importantly, the Framers considered the prospect of a 
general election.58 Early in the Constitutional Convention, James 
Wilson pointed out that the New York and Massachusetts constitu-
tions, which did not appoint state governors chosen by the state leg-
islature, resulted in governors “whose merits have general notori-
ety.”59 However, Framers such as George Mason were not easily 
convinced.60 So, Wilson came back with a more detailed proposal 
in which states were divided into electoral districts, each of which 
would elect an elector who would then vote for the president and 
vice president.61 Wilson’s proposal was largely accepted and seen 
as a mode of “election by the people.”62 This was true because, com-
pared to the appointment of state governors through the state legis-
lature, this method gave citizens and states considerable control over 
elections.63 
The instructions for conducting the presidential election are pre-
scribed in Article II, which vests power in the executive branch and 
sets forth the method by which the United States selects its president 
and vice president.64 Appointing electors is a power that has long 
been vested to each individual state.65 Article II, Section 1, Clause 
2 establishes that: 
[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Leg-
islature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, 
equal to the whole Number of Senators and 
 
 56 Whittington, supra note 54, at 922. The New Jersey Plan and the Virginia 
Plan highlighted the opposing interests of small versus large states. See id. at 923. 
 57 See id. at 923–24. 
 58 Id. at 924. 
 59 Id. (quoting MADISON, supra note 55, at 63). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 924–25 (quoting MADISON, supra note 55, at 102). 
 63 See id. at 925–26 (“[T]he Electoral College was a compromise that mini-
mized the apparent problems with either congressional selection of the president 
or a national popular vote.”). 
 64 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 65 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
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Representatives to which the State may be entitled in 
the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or 
Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the 
United States, shall be appointed an Elector.66 
Article II, Section 1, initially called for electors to cast two votes.67 
These votes were then counted by the House of Representatives, and 
the candidate with the highest number of votes became president 
while the candidate with the second highest number of votes became 
vice president.68 Shortly after, the problem arose that an election 
could result in a president and vice president who identified with 
different political parties.69 That issue came to fruition in both 1796 
and 1800.70 
B.  Enactment of the Twelfth Amendment 
In 1796, the presidential election resulted in a split-party presi-
dent and vice president.71 Federalists supported John Adams for 
president and Thomas Pinckney for vice president, while Anti-Fed-
eralists called for electors to support Thomas Jefferson for president 
and Aaron Burr for vice president.72 This rise in party-line voting 
did not align well with the Constitution because casting an electoral 
ballot for both Adams and Pinckney respectively could not ensure 
that Adams would become president with Pinckney serving as his 
 
 66 Id. 
 67 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
 68 Electoral College & Indecisive Elections, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Origins-De-
velopment/Electoral-College/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. In 1800, efficiency became a concern. See id. The presidential election 
resulted in the following electoral vote totals: seventy-three votes each for Aaron 
Burr and Thomas Jefferson, sixty-five votes for John Adams, sixty-four votes for 
Charles Pinckney, and one vote for John Jay. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 1024 (1801). 
Because two candidates received an equal number of electoral votes, the vote 
shifted to the House of Representatives. Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 
887, 947 (10th Cir. 2019), rev’d per curiam, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (discussing 
the presidential election of 1800). It took thirty-six rounds of polling for the House 
to elect Jefferson as the president. Id. 
 71 Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 947. 
 72 CONST. RTS. FOUND., The Troubled Elections of 1796 and 1800, BILL RTS. 
ACTION, Fall 2016, at 2. 
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vice president.73 Instead, numerous Federalist electors withheld 
their second ballot and did not cast a ballot for Thomas Pinckney.74 
This was an effort to ensure that Pinckney would receive just a few 
votes short of Adams but enough to win the vice presidency.75 This 
resulted in seventy-one votes for John Adams, sixty-eight votes for 
Thomas Jefferson, and fifty-nine votes for Thomas Pinckney.76 
Therefore, John Adams, a Federalist, was president alongside Vice 
President Thomas Jefferson, an Anti-Federalist.77 
In addition to resulting in a split-party president and vice presi-
dent, the 1796 election is also considered the first emergence of an 
elector exercising independent discretion.78 In 1796, Pennsylvania 
selected presidential electors by popular vote.79 The flawed Penn-
sylvania law, however, provided the governor with a limited amount 
of time to appoint the winners, resulting in the governor selecting 
electors prior to the completion of tallying votes.80 
Samuel Miles, a Pennsylvania elector, led a slate of fifteen elec-
tors who supported Federalism.81 This group of electors was ex-
pected to vote for John Adams.82 Although Adams was not an out-
right Federalist, it was largely known that he was the candidate who 
would support federalist ideals; conversely, Thomas Jefferson, a 
“firm Republican,” did not.83 When it came time for the governor to 
appoint Pennsylvania’s electors, thirteen electors supporting Jeffer-
son had won the popular vote.84 However, Greene County, 
 
 73 See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 947 (explaining that the 1796 
election result “created a ‘situation that was manifestly intolerable’” (quoting Ray 
v. Blair 343 U.S. 214, 224 n.11 (1952))). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. (“The 1796 electoral college vote consequently resulted in a President 
who, although disclaiming political affiliation, strongly favored Federalists, serv-
ing with a Vice President who was the leader of the opposing party.”). 
 78 See Electoral College Fast Facts, supra note 10; Faithless Electors, supra 
note 7 (documenting history of faithless electors). 
 79 See JEFFREY L. PASLEY, THE FIRST PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST 361–63 (2013) 
(describing Pennsylvania’s 1796 election). 
 80 See id. at 362. 
 81 See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 948. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. (quoting PASLEY, supra note 79, at 354). 
 84 PASLEY, supra note 79, at 363. 
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Pennsylvania, had not yet been tallied.85 Nonetheless, the governor 
appointed Miles and Robert Coleman, two Federalist electors, to be 
the state’s remaining presidential electors.86 Ultimately, the voting 
showed that two Anti-Federalist, Jefferson-supporting electors 
should have been appointed for Greene County.87 The electors who 
won the popular vote insisted that they replace Miles and Coleman 
but were refused.88 Thus, people were frustrated and wished for 
Miles and Coleman to support the “will of the majority” and vote 
for Jefferson.89 Out of fear, or moral desire to represent the majority, 
Miles voted for Jefferson.90 However, many were quick to criticize 
him for going against the will of the Federalists.91 In fact, a Phila-
delphia Newspaper headline reflected the frustration and anger vot-
ers felt, reading: “What, do I chuse Samuel Miles to determine for 
me whether John Adams or Thomas Jefferson shall be President? 
No! I chose him to act, not to think.”92 
In 1800, Electoral College procedures again resulted in a rival 
president and vice president, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, 
which convinced the Founders that a change was necessary.93 Ac-
cordingly, the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified 
in 1804.94 The Twelfth Amendment, which reworked Article II, Sec-
tion 1, Clause 3, constructs the Electoral College voting mechanisms 
used today.95 Electors are to meet and cast their ballots in their re-
spective states.96 Instead of casting two ballots generally, electors 
cast distinct and separate ballots for president and vice president.97 
A final list of all votes cast for president and vice president is signed 
 
 85 See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 948. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See PASLEY, supra note 79, at 363. 
 90 Id. Because Miles ran as a Federalist elector, many consider him the first 
faithless elector. See Faithless Electors, supra note 7. 
 91 See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 948. 
 92 Id. (citing STEPHEN J. WAYNE, THE ROAD TO THE WHITE HOUSE 6 (10th 
ed. 2016)). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 932. 
 95 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. Electors can only vote for one candidate from their respective state. See 
id. 
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and certified by each elector.98 This list is then sealed and transmit-
ted by the electors to the president of the Senate, who opens and 
counts the votes in the presence of the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives.99 The candidate who receives the majority of the elec-
toral votes for president and the candidate who receives the majority 
of the electoral votes for vice president shall assume their respective 
offices.100 In the event no majority exists for the presidency, the 
House of Representatives casts ballots on the top three candidates 
who received the most electoral votes for president.101 Whereas, if 
no majority exists for the vice president, the Senate casts ballots on 
the top two candidates who received the most electoral votes for vice 
president.102 Thus, the Twelfth Amendment restructured how elec-
toral votes are cast. 
C.  Modern Treatment of the Electoral College 
Many Americans are under the impression that our president is 
elected in November after each state has conducted its general elec-
tion.103 However, the Electoral College actually casts its ballots in 
December.104 In fact, Americans vote for electors who represent po-
litical parties in the hopes that the elector will cast his or her vote for 
that party’s nominee.105 Today, forty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia award all electoral votes to electors who represent the po-
litical party of the state’s popular vote winners.106 
 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. A quorum “of a member or members from two-thirds of the states” is 
necessary for such a vote to take place, and a candidate must receive a majority 
of the House of Representative votes cast. Id. 
 102 Id. A quorum “two-thirds of the whole number of Senators” is necessary 
for such a vote to take place, and a candidate must receive a majority of the Senate 
votes cast. Id. 
 103 See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 54, at 906 (clarifying and illustrating 
presidential election process). 
 104 Id. 
 105 See id.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 106 Electoral College FAQ, supra note 8. This system is referred to as the 
“winner-takes-all” model. Id. Main and Nebraska utilize an alternative plan 
known as the “district plan.” Id. 
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An overwhelming majority of electors are faithful to their pledge 
to support a particular candidate.107 This faithfulness led to state 
confidence in electoral pledges and influenced states to remove in-
dividual electoral candidate names from ballots, and replace them 
with “the presidential candidate of the national conventions” which 
would be counted as “a vote for the party’s nominees for the Elec-
toral College.”108 These “short-form ballots,” as Colorado argued, 
provide voters with “no basis for judging the prospective electors’ 
qualifications or trustworthiness, let alone uncovering their identi-
ties,” and “[a] voter . . . understandably believes that he or she is 
casting [his or her] ballot for actual presidential and vice presidential 
candidates.”109 Colorado correctly highlighted the confusion Amer-
icans have regarding U.S. voting procedures.110 Short-form ballots 
arguably disguise such state elections as ones where the people di-
rectly vote for presidential and vice presidential candidates.111 
Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia passed statutes 
to protect voters from elector discretion in one form or another 
through pledge laws.112 Pledge laws require electors to take an oath 
that they will vote for the candidates to whom they have pledged 
their support.113 Yet, a majority of states that require electors to take 
a pledge do not impose any penalty on electors who break the 
 
 107 See Faithless Electors, supra note 7 (documenting history of faithless elec-
tors). 
 108 Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 949 (10th Cir. 2019), rev’d per 
curiam, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 229 (1952)). 
 109 Id. at 950 (quoting Appellee’s Response Brief at 58–59, Baca v. Colo. 
Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887 (No. 18-1173)). 
 110 See id. 
 111 Id. In reality, people vote for electors, who today represent political parties, 
under the impression that the elector will cast their vote for that party’s nominee. 
See Whittington, supra note 54, at 906. 
 112 Faithless Elector State Laws, FAIR VOTE [hereinafter, Faithless Elector 
State Laws], https://www.fairvote.org/faithless_elector_state_laws (last updated 
July. 7, 2020). Seventeen states including, Texas, New York, Louisiana, Idaho, 
Illinois, North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, and Geor-
gia do not impose pledge laws. See id. While a lack of state pledge laws potentially 
signals support for independent electoral discretion, it is more likely due to the 
rare occurrence of faithless electors. See, e.g., Faithless Electors, supra note 7 
(describing history of faithless electors). 
 113 Faithless Elector State Laws, supra note 112. This means the elector will 
vote for the candidates of the political party the elector represents. Id. 
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pledge.114 In fact, those states, plus the District of Columbia, still 
submit all electoral votes to Congress.115 Alternatively, fifteen states 
enacted statutes supplementing pledge laws with sanctions,116 in-
cluding civil liability, criminal liability, and removal from the Elec-
toral College.117 
Five states impose penalties on electors who break their pledges: 
North Carolina imposes a civil fine,118 while California,119 New 
Mexico,120 Oklahoma,121 and South Carolina122 impose criminal li-
ability ranging from a misdemeanor to a felony. On top of these 
sanctions, Oklahoma and North Carolina refuse to transmit faithless 
votes to Congress.123 
The most popular mechanism for enforcing pledge laws is re-
moval. Fourteen states do not submit votes that violate a pledge to 
Congress;124 this includes Colorado.125 Colorado law implements a 
“removal-and-replacement system,”126 which means that electors 
who “refuse to act,” as required by pledge, are replaced with new 
electors until all electors act in accordance with Colorado law and 
cast their ballot for the winners of the Colorado popular vote.127 In 
the same vein, six states have enacted the Uniform Faithful 
 
 114 Id. Sixteen states plus the District of Columbia do not impose pledge laws. 
Id. These states include Oregon, Alaska, Hawaii, Wyoming, Wisconsin, Tennes-
see, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Virginia, Ohio, Maryland, Delaware, Con-
necticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont. See id. 
 115 See id. 
 116 See id. 
 117 See id.; Chris Tognotti, How Faithless Electors Can Be Criminally 
Charged, BUSTLE (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.bustle.com/articles/191444-crim-
inal-charges-for-faithless-electors-are-highly-uncommon-but-legal-in-these-
states. 
 118 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-212. 
 119 CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 6906, 18002 (Deering 2020). 
 120 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-9 (LexisNexis 2020). 
 121 OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 10-102, § 10-108, § 10-109. 
 122 S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-80 (2020). 
 123 Faithless Elector State Laws, supra note 112. Despite imposing criminal 
liability, California, New Mexico, and South Carolina did not enact laws regard-
ing the cancelation of faithless votes. See id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 2. 
 127 COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-304(1) (2020). 
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Presidential Electors Act (the “UFPEA”) to enforce removal.128 The 
UFPEA calls for electors to pledge their votes to the candidates of 
the political party they represent or face removal and replacement.129 
Under “winner-take-all” schemes, the UFPEA ensures that all elec-
toral votes are cast for the winners of the state popular vote. 
D.  The Surge in Faithless Electors 
The results of the November 2016 presidential election left 
many Americans upset with the Electoral College system.130 This 
was not just because of elector independence, but it was also because 
of a distrust in the Electoral College as a whole.131 Democrats in 
particular were angered by Donald Trump’s Electoral College ma-
jority, despite Secretary Clinton’s win of the national popular 
vote.132 Senator Barbara Boxer expressed wishes to abandon the 
Electoral College through a Constitutional amendment.133 She pro-
claimed the Electoral College to be an “outdated, undemocratic sys-
tem that does not reflect our modern society.”134 What ensued was 
a slew of people rushing to take a closer look at how the electoral 
vote in December 2016 might be swayed.135 Political activist Daniel 
Brezenoff began a movement, calling for electors to “exercise 
 
 128 See Faithless Elector State Laws, supra note 112. Amidst varying state 
laws, the Uniform Law Commission pushes for all states to enact the UFPEA. See 
Faithful Presidential Electors Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniform-
laws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=6b56b4c1-5004-48a5-
add2-0c410cce587d (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
 129 UNIF. FAITHFUL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS ACT §§ 4, 6(c) (UNIF. L. 
COMM’N 2010). 
 130 Whittington, supra note 54, at 912. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. After the 2016 election, Senator Boxer introduced a bill calling for the 
amendment of the Constitution to abolish the Electoral College and ensure “[o]ne 
person, one vote[.]” Corky Siemaszko, Senator Boxer Calls for Abolishing Elec-
toral College in Wake of Trump Win, NBC NEWS (Nov. 15, 2016, 6:09 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-election-day/sen-boxer-calls-abolish-
ing-electoral-college-n684386. 
 134 Siemaszko, supra note 133. 
 135 See Whittington, supra note 54, at 912. 
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judgment and choice” in evaluating the candidates for president.136 
He hoped that electors would either honor the national popular vote 
in favor of Clinton or would recognize then-presidential candidate 
Trump’s “danger to the Constitution” and cast their vote for an al-
ternative candidate.137 
One might argue that the Electoral College was created precisely 
for times such as this. Such an argument was made by so-called 
“Hamilton Electors,” who urged electors not to cast their votes for 
Donald Trump.138 These electors argued that Alexander Hamilton 
intended electors to “act as a constitutional failsafe against those 
lacking the qualification for becoming president.”139 Many clam-
ored to support this notion.140 The viewpoint was supported by the 
notion that the Framers “self-consciously limited the people’s 
voice” and created a Constitution that mirrored John Adams’ view 
that “[d]emocracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts and 
murders itself.”141 
 
 136 Id. at 912–13 (quoting Albert Kaufman, An Open Letter to the Electors, 
BLUEOREGON (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.blueoregon.com/2016/12/open-let-
ter-electors/); see also Tierney McAfee, Inside One Man’s “Hail Mary” Attempt 
to Yet Elect Hillary Clinton President, PEOPLE (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.ya-
hoo.com/news/inside-one-man-hail-mary-152440975.html. 
 137 McAfee, supra note 136. 
 138 HAMILTON ELECTORS, http://www.hamiltonelectors.com/about [https://
web.archive.org/web/20170126025006/www.hamiltonelectors.com/about] (last 
visited Jan 24, 2021). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Whittington, supra note 54, at 914. 
 141 See Peter Beinart, The Electoral College Was Meant to Stop Men Like 
Trump from being President, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.theat-
lantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/the-electoral-college-was-meant-to-stop-
men-like-trump-from-being-president/508310/ (quoting Letter from John Adams 
to John Taylor (Dec. 17, 1814) FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.ar-
chives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-6371). Some argue that while many 
Americans feel that the Framers created a superior democratic society, in fact the 
Framers created a system with both democratic and non-democratic features. See 
id. These non-democratic features include the Electoral College and the appoint-
ment of Supreme Court Justices. Id. 
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E.  Varied Treatment of State Appointment Power 
Congress has never failed to give power to a vote submitted to 
the Senate from a faithless elector.142 In 2016 alone, thirteen electors 
voted inconsistently.143 All thirteen of those votes were counted by 
Congress.144 And, before Colorado did so in 2016, no state had ever 
removed an elector for voting anomalously.145 
The 2016 election resulted in electors from four states—Colo-
rado, Minnesota, Washington, and California—filing suit to chal-
lenge their state electoral laws.146 All four cases were initially dis-
missed.147 Notably, only in the Tenth Circuit did the electors pre-
vail.148 Yet, the state supreme courts of Ohio,149 Alabama,150 and 
Kansas151 all expressed that elector independence in one form or an-
other stems from the Constitution.152 Interestingly, Colorado’s 
 
 142 Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 949 (10th Cir. 2019), rev’d per 
curiam, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020). 
 143 Id. at 950. The thirteen anomalous presidential electors in 2016 resulted in 
the following votes: three votes for Colin Powell (Washington), one vote for John 
Kasich (Texas), one vote for Ron Paul (Texas), one vote for Bernie Sanders (Ha-
waii), and one vote for Faith Spotted Eagle (Washington). Id. (citing 163 CONG. 
REC. H189 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2017)).The rest were for the electoral votes for vice 
president: two votes for Elizabeth Warren (Hawaii and Washington), one vote for 
Maria Cantwell (Washington), one vote for Susan Collins (Washington), one vote 
for Carly Fiorina (Texas), and one vote for Winona LaDuke (Washington). Id. 
(citing 163 CONG. REC. H189 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2017)). 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 949. 
 146 Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 8. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 See State ex rel. Beck v. Hummel, 80 N.E.2d 899, 908–09 (Ohio 1948) (“It 
is only by force of a moral obligation, not a legal one, that the presidential electors 
pledged to certain candidacies fulfill their pledges after election.”). 
 150 See Opinion of the Justices No. 87, 34 So. 2d 598, 600 (1948) (finding “the 
action of the electors in casting their votes by ballot is governed by the Federal 
Constitution” and such votes are bound to party nominees only by “virtue of their 
own consciences”). 
 151 See Breidenthal v. Edwards, 46 P. 469, 470 (1896) (“[I]f these electors 
should be chosen they will be under no legal obligation to support Sewall, Watson, 
or any other person named by a political party, but they may vote for any eligible 
citizen of the United States.”). 
 152 Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 10. 
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petition for certiorari noted a larger number of state court decisions 
have upheld state power to bind electors.153 
During the 2016 election, Washington imposed civil penalties 
on electors who did not comply with state law.154 Still, Washington 
submitted those electors’ ballots to the Senate.155 In Chiafalo, the 
Washington Supreme Court noted that nothing in Article II suggests 
that electors have an absolute freedom to vote as they please.156 
Washington law, at the time of litigation, imposed a civil penalty of 
up to $1,000 on electors who did not vote for the winners of the state 
popular vote as required by state law.157 The court felt that nothing 
about Washington’s state law interfered with the purposes of the 
Twelfth Amendment.158 The California Supreme Court came to the 
same conclusion for a similar law, finding that an elector’s “sole 
function is to perform a service which has come to be nothing more 
than clerical—to cast, certify and transmit a vote already predeter-
mined.”159 The California Supreme Court recognized that 
[i]t was originally supposed by the framers of our na-
tional constitution that the electors would exercise an 
independent choice, based upon their individual 
judgment. But in practice so long established as to be 
recognized as part of our unwritten law, they 
[act] . . . “simply to register the will of the appointing 
power in respect of a particular candidate.”160 
 
 153 Id. at 10–12; see, e.g., Spreckels v. Graham, 194 Cal. 516, 531–33 (1924) 
(“[T]he fact remains that the sole public duty to be performed by [electors] after 
election involves no exercise of judgment or discretion . . . .”). 
 154 In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 808 (Wash. 2019), aff’d sub nom, Chiafalo v. 
Washington 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020). 
 155 Id. Later, in 2019, Washington adopted the UFPEA. See Faithless Elector 
State Laws, supra note 112; Faithful Presidential Electors Act, supra note 128. 
 156 Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 10–11; see In re 
Guerra, 441 P.3d at 807. 
 157 In re Guerra, 441 P.3d at 808. 
 158 Id. at 810, 814. 
 159 Spreckels v. Graham, 194 Cal. 516, 531 (1924). 
 160 Id. (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892)). 
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There, the California court made an argument that the Tenth Circuit 
expressly rejected.161 
On the one hand, in Chiafalo, the Washington electors who did 
not cast their votes for the winners of the popular vote filed petitions 
for certiorari to the Supreme Court, arguing that the civil liabilities 
imposed on them were unconstitutional.162 On the other hand, in 
Baca, Mr. Baca argued that Colorado made an “unprecedented de-
cision to actually cancel the vote of a presidential elector.”163 While 
each case presented different facts, there was “no meaningful legal 
distinction in the question at the heart of each” case.164 Therefore, 
the Supreme Court was called upon to answer one question: Can 
states control electoral votes through state pledges?165 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S OPINION IN CHIAFALO 
The Supreme Court’s opinion can be organized into the follow-
ing sections: (1) application of Supreme Court precedent; (2) appli-
cation of Article II and its impact on state power to appoint electors; 
and (3) application of the Tenth Amendment and powers reserved 
to the states. 
A.  Legal Precedent: A Case of First Impression 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the original purpose of 
the Electoral College has evolved.166 Yet, because faithless electors 
have been few and far between, legal precedent on elector 
 
 161 Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 949–52 (10th Cir. 2019), rev’d 
per curiam, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020). 
 162 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316 
(2020) (No. 19-465) [hereinafter Washington Electors Petition for Writ of Certi-
orari]. 
 163 Baca Brief in Support of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 1–2. 
 164 Id. 
 165 See Washington Electors Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 162, at 
3–5; Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at i. 
 166 See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892) (“Doubtless it was sup-
posed that the electors would exercise a reasonable independence and fair judg-
ment in the selection of the Chief Executive, but experience soon demonstrated 
that . . . they were so chosen simply to register the will of the appointing power in 
respect of a particular candidate. In relation, then, to the independence of the elec-
tors, the original expectation may be said to have been frustrated.”). 
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independence is sparse.167 However, the topic of electoral independ-
ence was briefly addressed by the Court in Ray v. Blair.168 In Ray, 
the Court faced a similar question regarding electoral pledges re-
quired by political parties in primary elections.169 There, it held that, 
in states that permit political parties to (1) select electoral nominees 
through a primary election and (2) set qualifications for the electoral 
candidates, a political party may require candidates to pledge sup-
port to the party’s nominees without infringing on the Constitu-
tion.170 
The Court recognized that Article II, Section 1, grants states the 
power to “appoint electors in such manner, subject to possible con-
stitutional limitation, as it may choose.”171 In Ray, Alabama allowed 
political parties to utilize primary elections to select their candidates 
for the Electoral College.172 The chairman of the Alabama Executive 
Committee of the Democratic Party denied certification of Edmund 
Blair as a candidate for presidential elector in the Democratic pri-
mary.173 Blair refused to take a pledge, required by all Democratic 
candidates, to support “the nominees of the National Convention of 
the Democratic Party for President and Vice President of the United 
States.”174 
Mr. Blair argued that such a pledge violated the “freedom of a 
federal elector to vote in his Electoral College for his choice for 
President.”175 The Court disagreed, finding that “presidential elec-
tors exercise a federal function in balloting for President and Vice 
President, but they are not federal officers or agents any more than 
the state elector who votes for congressmen. They act by authority 
of the state that in turn receives its authority from the federal consti-
tution.”176 Thus, Article II, Section 1, creates an anomaly; electors 
play a unique role in that they cast a ballot for the highest office of 
 
 167 See, e.g., Faithless Electors, supra note 7 (documenting history of faithless 
electors). 
 168 Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228–31 (1952). 
 169 See id. at 215–18. 
 170 Id. at 231. 
 171 Id. at 227 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, §1). 
 172 See id. at 227. 
 173 Id. at 215. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 224–25 (emphasis added). 
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the national government but are under the control of their state gov-
ernment.177 The Court paid particular attention to societal practices 
and noted that: 
[h]istory teaches that electors were expected to sup-
port the party nominees. Experts in the history of 
government recognize the longstanding practice. In-
deed, more than twenty states do not print the names 
of the candidates for electors on the general election 
ballot. Instead, in one form or another they allow a 
vote for the presidential candidate of the national 
conventions to be counted as a vote for his party’s 
nominees for the electoral college.178 
Pledges used by political parties were essential to ensuring party 
candidates in the general election reflected “the philosophy and 
leadership of that party.”179 The Court reasoned that, although the 
Constitution allows electors to vote by ballot, nothing in the Consti-
tution limits electors from pledging their votes.180 In fact, it stated, 
“The suggestion that in the early elections candidates for electors—
contemporaries of the Founders—would have hesitated, because of 
constitutional limitations, to pledge themselves to support party 
nominees in the event of their selection as electors is impossible to 
accept.”181 
Ultimately, Ray dealt with electoral candidacy in a primary elec-
tion.182 Primary elections are distinct from general elections in that 
the elector is free to run independently.183 Alabama did not prohibit 
candidates who did not wish to align with political parties from par-
ticipating in the primary election.184 Thus, the Court reasoned that 
 
 177 Id. at 225, 227 (explaining that Article II grants states the “right to appoint 
electors in such manner, subject to possible constitutional limitations, as it may 
choose”); U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1. 
 178 Ray, 343 U.S. at 228–29 (footnotes omitted). 
 179 Id. at 227. 
 180 Id. at 228. 
 181 Id. 
 182 See id. at 215–16. 
 183 Id. at 230 (“A candidacy in the primary is a voluntary act of the appli-
cant.”). 
 184 Id. (“The state offers him opportunity to become a candidate for elector on 
his own terms, although he must file his declaration before the primary.”). 
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whether the Constitution granted electoral independence had no 
bearing on the issue at hand.185 
In Chiafalo, the Supreme Court faced a different question––
whether a state requirement to pledge support for a particular can-
didate in the general election for the presidency is legally enforcea-
ble.186 Under Colorado law, electors in the general election were 
provided with no alternative.187 If Colorado electors chose not to 
vote for the candidate winning the Colorado popular vote, they faced 
removal.188 Alternatively, in Ray, if electors chose not to comply 
with party requirements, they could run independently.189 Even with 
the legal precedent set under Ray, the Supreme Court agreed the sit-
uation in Chiafalo presented an issue of first impression.190 
B.  Article II: State Appointment Power 
By examining both historical and modern election practices, the 
Supreme Court majority applied a pragmatic interpretation of Arti-
cle II, overturning the Tenth Circuit’s originalist reading. 
1.  MANNER OF APPOINTMENT 
The Supreme Court held that state pledge laws do not violate the 
Constitution because Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, grants states a 
broad power to appoint electors.191 The Constitution empowers 
states to “appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may 
direct, a number of electors . . . .”192 As argued by Colorado, the 
word “Manner”193 endows states with the authority “to attach con-
ditions to their appointment.”194 Colorado pointed to Supreme Court 
precedent that referred to this electoral appointment power as 
 
 185 Id. (“[E]ven if . . . [there is] an assumed constitutional freedom of the elec-
tor under the Constitution . . . it would not follow that the requirement of a pledge 
in the primary is unconstitutional.”). 
 186 Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2320 (2020). 
 187 See id. at 2323. 
 188 See id. 
 189 Ray, 343 U.S. at 230. 
 190 Chiafalo, 591 U.S. at 2323–24. 
 191 Id. at 2324. 
 192 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 193 Id. 
 194 Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 19–20. 
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“plenary,” “exclusive,” and “comprehensive.”195 It maintained that 
the Tenth Circuit’s finding that state appointment power ceases once 
an elector begins balloting leaves state appointment power “hollow, 
rendering [states] powerless to vindicate their [appointment] rights 
under Article II.”196 
Under precedent set in McPherson v. Blacker, the Court inter-
preted the clause “as ‘convey[ing] the broadest power of determina-
tion’ over who becomes an elector.”197 In McPherson, Michigan 
electors contested the constitutionality of a Michigan law that called 
for the appointment of electors by congressional district.198 Uphold-
ing Michigan’s ability to do so, the Court set important precedent.199 
The Court noted that the Constitution does not prohibit nor require 
any method of appointment.200 While recognizing “that the word 
‘appoint’ is not the most appropriate word to describe the result of a 
popular election[,]”201 the Court found “it is sufficiently comprehen-
sive to cover that mode, and was manifestly used as conveying the 
broadest power of determination.”202 As such, the ability to direct 
the appointment of electors is left “exclusively” to the state legisla-
ture.203 
In Chiafalo, the Court reasoned that a state’s ability to appoint 
electors “in any manner” includes imposing conditions to 
 
 195 Id. at 20 (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27, 35 (1892)). 
 196 Id. at 20 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) 
(“[E]very right, when withheld, must have a remedy.”)). 
 197 Id. at 20 (quoting McPherson, 146 U.S. at 27). 
 198 McPherson, 146 U.S. at 24–25 (“The manner of the appointment of elec-
tors directed by the act of Michigan is the election of an elector and an alternate 
elector in each of the twelve congressional districts into which the State of Mich-
igan is divided, and of an elector and an alternate elector at large in each of two 
districts defined by the act.”). The Michigan electors argued that appointing elec-
tors by district infringed on the rights of voters to select and be represented by all 
of the state’s electors. See id. 
 199 Id. at 41–42. 
 200 Id. at 27 (“The Constitution does not provide that the appointment of elec-
tors shall be by popular vote, nor that the electors shall be voted for upon a general 
ticket, nor that the majority of those who exercise the elective franchise can alone 
choose the electors.”). 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. at 35. 
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appointment.204 This includes the ability to require that “an elector 
live in the State or qualify as a regular voter during the relevant time 
period.”205 Of course, this power is second to the Constitution.206 
Such conditions to appointment are not immune from other consti-
tutional provisions such as the Equal Protections Clause.207 How-
ever, “nothing in the Constitution expressly prohibits States from 
taking away presidential electors’ voting discretion.”208 Thus, the 
Court concluded that state pledges are merely conditions of appoint-
ment well within state power.209 
2.  THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT 
In further support of its reading of Article II, the Court pointed 
to historical practices and the enactment of the Twelfth Amendment. 
The Court held that the Constitution is “barebones about electors” 
and expressed that, if the Founders intended for the Electoral Col-
lege to be an independent body unencumbered by state control, they 
could have clearly done so.210 Mr. Baca argued that the Twelfth 
Amendment made clear that state appointment power ceased after 
electors were selected; therefore, Mr. Baca reasoned that Colorado 
could not remove him from the Electoral College once he cast his 
ballot.211 Pointing to its historical adoption, Colorado contended that 
the Twelfth Amendment merely solved the problem of a split-ticket 
president and vice president and that it did not provide grounds for 
finding validity in elector discretion.212 Colorado wrote that: 
The Twelfth Amendment thus permitted the voting 
public to select electors who would “vote for the 
party candidates for both offices,” allowing them to 
“carry out the desires of the people, without 
 
 204 Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2320 (2020). 
 205 Id. at 2324. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. at 2324 n.4. 
 208 Id. at 2324. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. at 2324–27 (reasoning that Framers could have included language in 
Constitution similar to language in the Constitutions of Maryland and Kentucky 
at the time). 
 211 Baca Brief in Support of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 20. 
 212 Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 22. 
2021] POWER TO THE PEOPLE 647 
 
confronting the obstacles which confounded the 
election[] of . . . 1800.” If anything, the Twelfth 
Amendment supports the contemporary practice of 
binding electors, not conferring independence on 
them. It was the solution to the unique problems 
posed when electors are pledged and bound to the 
candidates of their declared party. Without that his-
torical practice, dating back to at least 1800, the 
Twelfth Amendment would not have been necessary 
in the first place.213 
The Court agreed.214 It reasoned that faithless electors did not pose 
enough of a problem for the Framers to take interest in combating 
elector independence at the time of the ratification of the Twelfth 
Amendment.215 Instead, the primary concern was split-party tickets 
during a rise in allegiance to political parties.216 The Twelfth 
Amendment “brought the Electoral College’s voting procedures into 
line with the Nation’s new party system[,]” and by 1832, “all States 
but one had introduced popular presidential elections.”217Although 
some Framers penned their expectations that “the Electoral College 
would ‘be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citi-
zens,’ whose choices would reflect ‘discretion and discernment[,]’” 
such words never made it into the Constitution.218 In fact, as early 
as 1833, courts and commentators recognized that “exercise of an 
independent judgment [by an elector] would be treated[] as a politi-
cal usurpation, dishonourable to the individual, and a fraud upon his 
constituents.”219 
 
 213 Id. at 22–23 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Ray v. 
Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224 n.11 (1952)). 
 214 See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2324–25 (finding primary purpose of the 
Twelfth Amendment was to solve split-party outcomes). 
 215 See id. at 2324–26. 
 216 Id. at 2327. 
 217 Id. at 2321. 
 218 Id. at 2325–26 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 391 (John Jay) (Clin-
ton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 219 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES §1457, 322 (1833). 
648 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:620 
 
3.  THE MEANING OF A “VOTE” 
The Court examined Mr. Baca’s argument that the use of the 
words “elector,” “vote,” and “ballot” in the Constitution demon-
strated the Framers intent for the Electoral College to vote freely.220 
Because interpreting the Constitution requires one to look at how 
the vocabulary would have been understood at the time of drafting, 
it is worth examining several early American dictionaries.221 In 
1785, the word “elector” was defined as someone “that has a vote in 
the choice of any officer”222 or “[o]ne who chooses, one who has a 
vote in the choice of any public officer.”223 “To vote” was defined 
as, “[s]uffrage; voice given and numbered,”224 and as a “[v]oice, 
[a]dvice, or [o]pinion of a [m]atter in [d]ebate.”225 Lastly, dictionar-
ies defined “ballot” as “[a] little ball or ticket used in giving votes, 
being put privately into a box or urn.”226 Further, “to ballot” was 
defined as “putting little balls or tickets, with particular marks, pri-
vately in a box; by counting which, it is known what is the result of 
the poll, without any discovery by whom each vote was given.”227 
The Court did not find that any of the language in the Constitu-
tion implies individual discretion.228 It made an important distinc-
tion that, while a vote is choice, a vote does not “always connote 
 
 220 Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2325–26. 
 221 See id.; United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931) (“The Consti-
tution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used 
in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.”). 
 222 Elector, 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(6th ed. 1785). 
 223 Elector, 1 JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1775); see also Elector, THOMAS DYCHE & WILLIAM 
PARDON, A NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (14th ed. 1771) (defining “elec-
tor” as “a person who has a right to elect or choose a person into an office”); 
Elector, NOAH WEBSTER, A COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1806) (defining “elector” as “one who elects,” and “elect” as “to 
choose, select for favor, prefer”). 
 224 JOHNSON, supra note 222, at Vote. 
 225 Vote, NATHAN BAILEY, A UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (20th ed.1765). 
 226 JOHNSON, supra note 222, at Ballot; see also ASH, supra note 223, at Ballot 
(defining “ballot” as “[t]o choose by dropping a little ball or ticket into a box; to 
choose by holding up the hand”). 
 227 JOHNSON, supra note 222, at To Ballot (emphasis added). 
 228 Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2325–26 (2020). 
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independent choice.”229 The Court pointed to voting mechanisms 
like proxy voting where one casts a ballot on behalf of another in 
accordance with the principal’s wishes.230 In that instance, balloting 
does not encompass the freedom to vote as one pleases.231 Addition-
ally, the Court provided examples of when a vote is valid even if the 
result of outside influence, including the guidance of unions, pas-
tors, and spouses.232 Yet, whether a vote necessarily connotes an in-
dependent choice does not in itself negate the practice of state 
pledges.233 Rather, it is the finding that states may regulate this dis-
cretion as a condition of appointment that matters in this case.234 
C.  The Tenth Amendment: Powers Reserved to the States 
Colorado looked to the Tenth Amendment, arguing that it pro-
vided an alternative ground for state control of electors.235 Colorado 
pointed to Supreme Court precedent to illustrate that “the Framers 
intended the States to ‘keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth 
Amendment, the power to regulate elections.’”236 The Tenth 
Amendment reads, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
to the States respectively, or to the people.”237 Amidst public fear of 
a strong national government, states ratified the Tenth Amendment, 
as part of the Bill of Rights, to confirm elements of state sover-
eignty.238 Colorado argued that while the Federal government 
 
 229 Id. (“[V]oting is still voting when discretion departs.”). 
 230 Id. at 2325. 
 231 See id. 
 232 Id. (“Suppose a person always votes in the way his spouse, or pastor, or 
union tells him to. We might question his judgment, but we would have no prob-
lem saying that he “votes” or fills in a “ballot.”). 
 233 See id. at 2325–26. 
 234 See id. at 2326. It is important to keep in mind that States are under no 
requirement to bar electors from exercising independent judgement. See id at 
2328. 
 235 Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 26. 
 236 Id. (quoting Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013)). 
 237 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 238 See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733 (1931) (“The Tenth 
Amendment was intended to confirm the understanding of the people at the time 
the Constitution was adopted, that powers not granted to the United States were 
reserved to the States or to the people. It added nothing to the instrument as orig-
inally ratified . . . .”). 
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regulates national elections, the states retain power to “prescribe the 
qualifications of its officers,”239 including the power to “establish 
qualifications” for their presidential electors.240 
The Supreme Court majority did not address the Tenth Amend-
ment in its opinion; instead, the Court found support for pledge laws 
in Article II.241 Contrarily, Justice Thomas, who concurred in the 
judgment, found that support for state pledge requirements stems 
from the Tenth Amendment, not Article II.242 Justice Thomas relied 
heavily on a narrow application of U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, consistent with the reasoning he expressed there in his 
dissenting opinion.243 Justice Thomas maintained that “‘[w]here the 
Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular power[,] that 
is, where the Constitution does not speak either expressly or by nec-
essary implication,’ the power is ‘either delegated to the state gov-
ernment or retained by the people.’”244 In agreement with the ma-
jority that nowhere in the Constitution are states expressly granted 
or prohibited the power to enact and enforce state pledges, Justice 
Thomas found that the Tenth Amendment provides Constitutional 
support for the practice of state pledges.245 
The issue the concurring opinion took with the majority con-
cerned the interpretation and application of “‘Manner’” in Article 
II.246 The concurrence felt that the majority’s reading of Article II 
was too broad and argued that nothing about state pledge laws con-
cerns appointment.247 Thus, including “the power to impose require-
ments as to how the electors vote after they are appointed” within 
Article II’s delegation of appointment power, bends the language 
 
 239 Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 26 (quoting Sug-
arman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)). 
 240 Id. (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 861 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 241 See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2324 (2020). 
 242 Id. at 2329, 2333 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 243 See id. at 2329. 
 244 Id. at 2334 (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 
U.S. at 847–848 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 245 Id. at 2333–34. 
 246 Id. at 2330 (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 1). 
 247 See id. at 2331 (finding that Washington’s pledge law “simply regulated 
electors’ votes, unconnected to the appointment process”). 
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into something it is not.248 Justice Thomas compared Article II, Sec-
tion 1, Clause 2,249 with the Elections Clause, Article I, Section 4, 
Clause 1.250 In U.S. Term Limits, Inc., the Court held that “‘Manner’ 
in Article I includes only ‘a grant of authority to issue procedural 
regulations,’ not ‘the broad power to set qualifications.’”251 The ar-
gument followed that “Manner” in Article II could not include the 
ability to set qualifications for electors; instead, that power stemmed 
from the Tenth Amendment.252 
However, this argument fails to recognize the difference be-
tween the role of an elector and the role of a member of Congress. 
Members of Congress are “officer[s] of the union, deriving [their] 
powers and qualifications from the constitution, and [are] neither 
created by, dependent upon, nor controllable by the states.”253 An 
elector is an integral piece of a larger voting process used to elect 
the president and vice president, not an officer of the federal gov-
ernment.254 As such, an elector’s oath to support the winner of the 
popular vote does nothing more than create a system for represent-
ing the will of the people. As was the case in U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 
imposing qualifications for members of Congress beyond those 
 
 248 Id. at 2330. 
 249 Id. at 2329–31. “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legisla-
ture thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Sen-
ators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .” 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 250 Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2329–31 (Thomas, J., concurring). “The Times, 
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall 
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at 
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, 
cl.1. 
 251 Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2331 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832– 833 (1995) (majority opinion)). Jus-
tice Thomas took issue with the Court’s finding that “Manner” in Article I and 
Article II granted different powers. Id. 
 252 See id. at 2333–35. 
 253 U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 803 (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 627, 435 (3d ed. 
1858)). 
 254 See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224–25 (1952) (“The presidential elec-
tors . . . are not federal officers or agents any more than the state elector who votes 
for congressmen. They act by authority of the state that in turn receives its author-
ity from the federal constitution.”). 
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outlined in the Constitution limits who is eligible to run for office.255 
Conversely, pledge laws have no bearing on the eligibility of candi-
dates for president and vice president. Pledge laws are procedural in 
nature because they protect the integrity of individual voters rather 
than alter qualifications for the national legislature.256 Although not 
addressed by the majority, precedent set in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. 
makes clear that “[s]tates are . . . entitled to adopt ‘generally appli-
cable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reli-
ability of the electoral process itself.’”257 Pledge laws do exactly that 
by creating a system that reflects the “fundamental principle of our 
representative democracy” that “the people should choose whom 
they please to govern them.”258 
V.  THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 
While the Court’s opinion assuages potential issues with the 
Electoral College, it addresses just the tip of the iceberg. The major-
ity upheld state pledge laws under a broad interpretation of Article 
II appointment power, without much comment on the bounds of 
such power.259 Under existing laws, broad state power may be nec-
essary; however, considering the decision and the rise in societal 
challenges to the traditional function of the Electoral College, con-
gressional action should be taken before new problems arise. 
A.  Filling in Constitutional Gaps 
Broad state power may be necessary when one thinks about the 
holes left by the Framers. The Constitution is not perfect and did, in 
 
 255 U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 837–38. 
 256 See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2328. 
 257 U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 834 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 
460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)). 
 258 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (quoting a speech by Al-
exander Hamilton in 2 JOHN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 257 (2d ed. 
1836)). 
 259 Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2328–29. The Court noted that the decision does not 
validate state pledges requiring electors to vote for deceased candidates, id. at 
2328 n.8, nor does it permit state pledges that frustrate other provisions of the 
Constitution, see id. at 2324 n.4. 
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fact, leave many questions unanswered.260 The Supreme Court’s 
green light to enforcing state pledges protects the integrity of state 
popular votes in states that require them; but, some question whether 
the Supreme Court was the correct body to address this issue.261 Un-
der the Twelfth Amendment, the president of the Senate counts the 
electoral votes before the House of Representatives and Senate.262 
Because Congress counted the electoral votes of Washington and 
Colorado in 2016, some argue that Congress approved of the states’ 
actions and that there was no need for judicial action.263 
However, this argument fails to take into account the intricacies 
of election processes and state pledge laws, which can also involve 
civil penalties.264 Waiting on congressional action weeks after pop-
ular votes are conducted is unrealistic and inefficient, and Con-
gress’s validation of such a small percentage of faithless elector 
votes is not indicative of congressional power.265 Further, Congress 
counted the electoral votes of Washington electors who disobeyed 
state law, as well as the electoral votes of the Colorado replacement 
electors.266 Such actions are more akin to simple procedure than a 
conscious decision to comment on the validity of individual state 
actions. Congress had no choice to make, especially when consider-
ing Colorado’s faithless electors did not submit their votes to the 
Senate.267 Ultimately, the Electoral College as it stood was a ticking 
time bomb.268 The Supreme Court rightfully stepped in to interpret 
the basic construction of the Electoral College and its constitutional 
function in today’s political climate. Chiafalo confirmed that 
 
 260 See, e.g., id. at 2324 (describing Constitution as “barebones,” regarding 
guidance on electors). 
 261 See Derek Muller, Leave Courts out of Presidential Elector Dispute, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 22, 2020, 11:30 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2020/04/symposium-leave-courts-out-of-presidential-elector-dispute/. 
 262 Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 263 Muller, supra note 261. 
 264 See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2322 (noting that at the time of the 2016 elec-
tions, electors in Washington faced civil penalties for failing to comply with 
pledge laws). 
 265 See id. at 2328 (“Congress’s deference to a state decision to tolerate a faith-
less vote is no ground for rejecting a state decision to penalize one.”). 
 266 163 CONG. REC. H189 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2017). 
 267 See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 920 (10th Cir. 2019), rev’d 
per curiam, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020). 
 268 See supra Part III.E (discussing varied state appointment conditions). 
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electoral power is not absolute and must comply with state appoint-
ment laws. Left unanswered are the bounds of such appointment 
powers. Some argue that Congress cannot interfere with state ap-
pointment power,269 but is election of the most powerful federal of-
fice beyond federal regulation?  
1.  BROAD STATE POWER IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPREHENSIVE 
FEDERAL LAW 
There are several issues surrounding the Electoral College that 
neither the Constitution nor federal law address. Given that electors 
are elected in November and cast their votes in December,270 there 
are myriad issues that could arise, including arrest or illness, of ei-
ther the elector or candidate. Colorado argued that the ability to re-
move electors is necessary in events such as when an elector refuses 
to cast a vote, or votes for a candidate who does not meet the con-
stitutional qualifications for president.271 In fact, states have enacted 
laws allowing electors to be replaced in cases of “death, sickness[,] 
resignation or otherwise.”272 States have also enacted laws expressly 
allowing for elector discretion when a candidate dies before elec-
toral votes are cast.273 Such state laws demonstrate that states require 
the power to ensure that electors are present and comply with the 
Constitution.274 
Additionally, electors are not bound by federal transparency 
laws, unlike other political candidates and officials who must dis-
close certain financial contributions.275 In theory, electors can sell 
 
 269 See Dan T. Coenen & Edward J. Larson, Congressional Power Over Pres-
idential Elections: Lessons from the Past and Reforms for the Future, 43 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 851, 875 (2002) (stating that Congress cannot “tamper with basic 
state rues about the selection of presidential electors”).  
 270 Whittington, supra note 54, at 906. 
 271 See Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 23–24. 
 272 Id. at 24 (citing 1800–1801 Mass. Acts 172–73). 
 273 Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2328 n.8 (2020). 
 274 See Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 24. 
 275 See States Can Require Presidential Electors to Follow Popular Vote, U.S. 
Supreme Court Rules, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (July 6, 2020), https://campaignle-
gal.org/press-releases/states-can-require-presidential-electors-follow-popular-
vote-us-supreme-court-rules (discussing potential bribery of the Electoral Col-
lege). 
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their vote without the public having any knowledge.276 Although so-
cietal expectations and moral high grounds have kept electors over-
whelmingly in line with supporting the popular vote,277 the public 
should be protected from loopholes in the structure of the Constitu-
tion.  
Congress recognizes state power to settle issues that arise sur-
rounding electoral appointment in the Electoral Count Act (the 
“ECA”). The ECA expressly gives states the power to make a “final 
determination” over “any controversy or contest” over the appoint-
ment of an elector.278 State failure to resolve election issues results 
in congressional review.279 The Supreme Court has never com-
mented on the constitutionality of the ECA outright; however, Jus-
tice Breyer expressed approval of the ECA in his dissent in Bush v. 
Gore. Putting constitutionality aside, the ECA is a clear indicator 
that some level of congressional control over elections is necessary 
and accepted.280 Given the ambiguities in federal election practices, 
 
 276 Id. 
 277 See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2328 (discussing rarity of faithless electors). 
 278 3 U.S.C. § 5 (such determination must be “made at least six days prior to 
said time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the 
counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter 
regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed by such State is 
concerned”). 
 279 3 U.S.C. § 15; see Coenen & Larson, supra note 269, at 876 (2002) (noting 
that the ECA did not place additional duties on states, but instead, it encouraged 
timely reporting). 
 280 There are several congressional acts that regulate federal elections. The 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 upholds the principles of the Equal Protections Clause 
and Fifteenth Amendment by prohibiting voting qualifications or standards that 
result in the denial of the right to vote. 52 U.S.C. § 10301; see Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, HISTORY (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.history.com/topics/black-his-
tory/voting-rights-act (discussing Selma to Montgomery March, which prompted 
President Johnson to combat voter discrimination). After the 2000 presidential 
election, Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act, which established mini-
mum standards for certain election functions that, if met, qualified states to re-
ceive additional funding, and created the Election Assistance Commission to re-
view state election procedures. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–20921; see also Amanda 
K. Myers, Importing Democracy: Can Lessons Learned from Germany, India, 
and Australia Help Reform the American Electoral System?, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 
1113, 1136 (2010) (discussing voting technology requirements the Help America 
Vote Act established). 
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it can be argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Con-
gress the authority to fill in the gaps left by the Framers.281 
2.  GRANTING BROAD APPOINTMENT POWER UPHOLDS 
FEDERALIST PRINCIPLES 
State ability to direct the manner of electoral appointment goes 
hand in hand with state power to regulate state elections. Under Ar-
ticle I, Section 4, “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elec-
tions for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each 
State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time 
by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of 
Chusing Senators.”282 Accordingly, states employ various laws gov-
erning voter eligibility.283 These laws differ mainly on the ability of 
convicted felons, as well as the mentally incompetent, to vote.284 
Some argue that these incongruencies are solved through independ-
ent electors who serve as a check on state power and undue influence 
by representing both voters and non-voters.285 
Under Supreme Court precedent, these arguments now ring hol-
low. The Electoral College was not an attempt by the Framers to 
achieve equality or protect individual voters—rather, it was a com-
promise amongst states to maintain federalism.286 This compromise 
ultimately left each state nearly complete control over its participa-
tion in national government elections and created a system to 
 
 281 See Edward B. Foley, Preparing for a Disputed Presidential Election: An 
Exercise in Election Risk Assessment and Management, 51 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 309, 
324–326 (2019) (“Congress, being a political body, expresses the people’s will 
far more accurately than does an unelected court.”). 
 282 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 283 See generally Voter Registration Rules, VOTE.ORG, 
https://www.vote.org/voter-registration-rules/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (outlin-
ing voter eligibility requirements for all states). 
 284 Id. 
 285 See Derek T. Muller, Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College, 44 
ARIZ. STATE L. J. 1237, 1239 (2012) (examining purpose of the Electoral Col-
lege). 
 286 Amanda Onion, How the Great Compromise and the Electoral College Af-
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apportion to each state a number of electoral votes.287 Thus, the Su-
preme Court’s ruling of broad appointment power is congruent with 
the principles of federalism embedded in Article I and Article II. 
B.  Looking Towards Reform 
The Supreme Court’s findings do not make electoral reform im-
possible. Various actions can be taken by states to change how elec-
tors are required to vote.288 “The District Plan” is an alternative elec-
tor appointment system currently used in Maine and Nebraska.289 
Under the District Plan, the number of a state’s electors remains 
equal to that state’s delegation in the House of Representatives plus 
two, one elector for each of the state’s senators; however, the voters 
in each congressional district in that state would vote for one elec-
tor,290 and the remaining two electors are required to vote for the 
candidate who wins the state’s popular election.291 Notably, critics 
argue that relying on congressional districts will lead to increased 
gerrymandering.292 Alternatively, “The Automatic Plan” requires 
electoral votes to be given to the state plurality winner.293 
Surprisingly, Colorado’s argument before the Supreme Court in-
cluded nothing about the National Popular Vote Compact (“the 
Compact”), which Colorado enacted, but mentioning its existence 
when discussing modern practices and potential alternatives is fit-
ting.294 The Compact is a means of ensuring that the president and 
vice president are the winners of the national popular vote.295 The 
Compact states that all members will appoint electors who will cast 
 
 287 Id. 
 288 See Joy McAfee, Should the College Electors Finally Graduate? - The 
Electoral College: An American Compromise from its Inception to Election, 32 
CUMB. L. REV. 643, 666–70 (2002) (describing various alternatives to current 
Electoral College). 
 289 Id. at 669. 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. at 669–70. 
 292 Id. at 670. 
 293 Id. 
 294 Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular 
Vote, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE (Feb. 13, 2020) [hereinafter National Popular Vote 
Explanation], https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation. 
 295 See id. (“[B]ecause of state winner-take-all statutes, five of our 45 Presi-
dents have come into office without having won the most popular votes nation-
wide.”). 
658 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:620 
 
their vote in accordance with the winner of the national popular 
vote.296 The Compact has been enacted by fifteen states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia—a total of 196 electoral votes—and will go into 
effect once an additional 74 electoral votes join.297 
However, even if the Compact is enacted by states holding a ma-
jority of the electoral votes, its constitutionality is questionable and 
hotly debated.298 Critics point out that the Compact’s language does 
not adequately deal with numerous situations, including withdraw-
als from the Compact, states tampering with elections, and election 
recounts.299 Second, critics point to the Compact Clause of Article 
I, Section 10, which prohibits states from entering into agreements 
with one another without congressional approval.300 Compact sup-
porters rebut this argument by pointing to Supreme Court precedent 
that authorizes certain agreements between states.301 Yet, there are 
critics who argue that even if not prohibited by the Compact Clause, 
it is unconstitutional under Article II.302 In particular, it has been 
argued that while states have broad discretion to appoint electors, 
doing so based on the winners of the national popular vote in other 
states is unconstitutional because the constitutional purpose of elec-
tors is to represent the people of their respective states.303 
Although there is no ruling on the constitutionality of the Com-
pact, the Court has held that states have broad appointment pow-
ers,304 and it may not be unreasonable to conclude that states can 
require electors to take pledges to vote for the national popular vote 
winner. After all, Article II gives states the “‘broadest power of de-
termination’ over who becomes an elector.”305 Thus, if states and 
their citizenry support such agreements, who is to stop them? 
 
 296 Text of the National Popular Vote Compact Bill, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE 
https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/bill-text (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
 297 National Popular Vote Explanation, supra note 294. 
 298 See Norman R. Williams, Why the National Popular Vote Compact is Un-
constitutional, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1523, 1539 (2012) (arguing that National Pop-
ular Vote Compact violates Article II). 
 299 Id. 
 300 Id. at 1526. 
 301 Id. at 1539–40. 
 302 Id. at 1540. 
 303 Id. 
 304 Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2324 (2020). 
 305 Id. (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1982)). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Baca and Chiafalo is sup-
ported by modern practices and federalist ideologies. The Tenth Cir-
cuit made a compelling argument in favor of elector independence, 
emphasizing the historical intent of the Framers.306 The Supreme 
Court, however, did not shy away from historical intent; rather, the 
Court looked beyond the text to early state practices and scholar-
ship.307 The Court’s opinion is an important acknowledgment of 
some of the oldest American values—representation in government 
and voting. The ruling acknowledges that it is up to the individual 
states to determine how to handle electoral appointment proce-
dures.308 Thus, even under a liberal reading of the Constitution, the 
basic principles of federalism are kept intact. Those who seek to 
abolish or reform the Electoral College must realize the answer lies 
not in the Supreme Court but, rather, in the hands of the people, who 
must urge Congress or their states’ legislatures, to act. After all, we 
live under the “trust of a Nation that here, We the People rule.”309 
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